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RESPONSES TO THE FIVE QUESTIONS 
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.† 
1. TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, WHAT IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEGACY 
LEFT BY THE TERRORIST ATTACKS?  ARE WE SAFER? 
These questions are best addressed in reverse order, that is, by 
celebrating the fact that Americans have, with few exceptions, been 
kept safe since 9/11, if we define security as avoiding the dangers 
presented by the sort of nonstate terrorists who conducted the 
9/11 attacks. 
The numbers tell the story.  As former Director of National 
Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair points out, since 9/11 only 
seventeen Americans have been killed on U.S. soil by terrorists 
(and most of those in a single incident at Fort Hood, Texas).1  As 
tragic as those deaths are, consider that “some 150,000 people have 
been murdered in the United States since 9/11.”2  Of course, it also 
should not be forgotten that thousands of American servicemen 
and women have been killed or wounded in overseas operations 
intended to ensure the safety of their countrymen at home, and it 
appears that they have largely succeeded.  The price of domestic 
security has been very steep. 
As further context, we should keep in mind that terrorism, 
however loathsome and fearful, is nevertheless, a non-existential 
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 1.  Noah Shachtman, Former Intel Chief: Call Off the Drone War (And Maybe the 
Whole War on Terror), WIRED (July 28, 2011, 9:48 PM), http://www.wired.com 
/dangerroom/2011/07/call-off-the-drone-war/.  Admiral Blair also said that 
fourteen of those deaths were the result of one incident at Fort Hood, Texas.  
Actually, thirteen persons were killed and forty-three were wounded at Fort Hood 
on November 5, 2009 by a shooter alleged to be Army Major Nidal Hasan.  See 
DEP’T OF DEF., PROTECTING THE FORCE: LESSONS FROM FORT HOOD 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DOD-ProtectingTheForce-Web 
_Security_HR_13jan10.pdf. 
 2.  Scott Shane, Al Qaeda’s Outsize Shadow, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/qaeda.html. 
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threat.  That is, whatever havoc and heartbreak al Qaeda or similar 
terrorists might wreak in a particular situation, they lack the 
capacity under any circumstances to physically destroy the United 
States as that would require the concerted action of one or more 
powerful nation-states.  In that regard, we cannot be as sanguine 
about our security, especially as we look to a future in which we 
must expect to find peer competitors who aim to match our 
military prowess. 
With that background, the most significant legacy left by the 
terrorist attacks may not be the destruction, per se, but rather the 
rise of what Fareed Zakaria calls the “national-security state” that 
“now touches every aspect of American life, even when seemingly 
unrelated to terrorism.”3  A variety of post-9/11 legislation—the 
USA PATRIOT Act4 being the quintessential illustration—arguably 
operates to make us safer.  At the same time, however, critics are 
becoming increasingly concerned that it has come at an excessive 
cost to civil liberties.  Among other things, they contend that the 
PATRIOT Act is being interpreted in a way that allows “the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to conduct some kind of unspecified 
domestic surveillance that they say does not dovetail with a plain 
reading of the statute.”5 
Moreover, in the years since 9/11, “the U.S. intelligence 
system has exploded in size” and nearly tripled its collective 
budget.6  Interestingly, technology developed for military 
applications is migrating to domestic law enforcement uses.  
Clearly, such technology has vastly empowered government’s ability 
 
 3.  Fareed Zakaria, What America Has Lost: It’s Clear We Overreacted to 9/11, 
NEWSWEEK MAG., Sept. 4, 2010, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09 
/04/zakaria-why-america-overreacted-to-9-11.html. 
 4.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered titles of 
U.S.C.).  For a summary of the highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, see generally 
The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/archive 
/ll/highlights.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 5.  See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Public Said to Be Misled on Use of the PATRIOT Act, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09 
/22/us/politics/justice-dept-is-accused-of-misleading-public-on-patriot-act.html. 
 6.  Liz Goodwin, Top 10 Blockbuster Revelations from the Washington Post’s 
Intelligence Complex Exposé, THE UPSHOT-YAHOO! NEWS (July 21, 2010), http://news 
.yahoo.com/blogs/upshot/top-10-blockbuster-revelations-washington-post-
intelligence-complex-152517904.html. 
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to monitor U.S. civilians.7  For example, unmanned aircraft, not 
unlike the drones developed for battlefield use, have found their 
way into the inventories of local police departments.8 
Perhaps the “poster child” of this phenomenon is the 
landmark case of United States v. Jones,9 decided by the Supreme 
Court in January, which involved global-positioning systems (GPS) 
devices.10  GPS was deployed by the military for navigation and 
weapons’ targeting purposes, but is available to the public as well as 
other governmental agencies, including police forces.  Jones 
addressed the question of whether police agencies can, without a 
warrant, attach a GPS device to a suspect’s car in order to track him 
over an extended period.11  Dissecting the Court’s decision is 
beyond the scope of this essay, but suffice it to say that it represents 
a refreshing indication that the Court is willing to begin to draw 
some lines with respect to the burgeoning use by the police of 
powerful new technologies that often were originally designed for 
military purposes. 
Lower courts for some time have been troubled by the use of 
these new technologies originally designed to combat foreign 
enemies.  The New York Times reports that “[i]n a series of rulings 
on the use of satellites and cellphones to track criminal suspects, 
judges around the country have been citing George Orwell’s ‘1984’ 
to sound an alarm.”12  And Congress is concerned as well.13  
 
 7.  See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Big Brother Surveillance: Getting Bigger, ACS BLOG 
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/big-brother-surveillance-getting-
bigger (describing the government’s use of technology to monitor civilians). 
 8.  Ana Campoy, The Law’s New Eye in the Sky, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020431900457708889136178201
0.html.  
 9.  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
 10.  Concerning global-positioning system technology, see generally Global 
Positioning Systems Directorate, LOS ANGELES AIR FORCE BASE (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://www.losangeles.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5311. 
 11. The Court held that the installation of a GPS device on a vehicle is a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but did not reach the 
question whether it was a “reasonable” search since the Court concluded that the 
government had waived that argument.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. 
 12.  Adam Liptak, Court Case Asks if ‘Big Brother’ Is Spelled GPS, N.Y. TIMES., 
Sept. 10, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/us/11gps 
.html. 
 13.  See generally RICHARD M. THOMPSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42109, 
GOVERNMENTAL TRACKING OF CELL PHONES AND VEHICLES: THE CONFLUENCE OF 
PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs 
/intel/R42109.pdf (describing Congressional efforts to modernize the law in light 
of technological changes). 
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Senators Mark Udall and Ron Wyden warn that “[r]ecent advances 
in geolocation technology have made it increasingly easy to secretly 
track the movements and whereabouts of individual Americans on 
an ongoing, 24/7 basis.”14  Consequently, they have demanded that 
intelligence agencies disclose the authorities they are relying upon 
for domestic operations.15 
The potential for further exploitation is extant because new 
technologies do not just enhance the surveillance capabilities of 
police forces; they can “data mine” vast quantities of information to 
produce reports on individual citizens.  This capability has become 
an important homeland security tool, even as concerns are raised 
about data quality and privacy.16  Ongoing developments do indeed 
have an Orwellian flavor; one company claims that its program has 
enabled police agencies to stop repeat offenders by “identifying 
who is most likely to break the law again.”17 
In another development, the use of what are called “national 
security letters” (NSLs) by various investigative agencies has grown 
remarkably since 9/11.  According to the Congressional Research 
Service, NSLs—which do not require court approval—are “roughly 
comparable to administrative subpoenas” and “[i]ntelligence 
agencies issue them for intelligence gathering purposes to 
telephone companies, Internet service providers, consumer credit 
reporting agencies, banks, and other financial institutions . . . .”18  
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) contends that NSLs 
allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation to “compile vast dossiers 
about innocent people.”19  According to the ACLU, the FBI issued 
200,000 NSLs between 2003 and 2006 and, in doing so, the FBI’s 
own inspector general found the Bureau committed “serious . . . 
 
 14.  Spencer Ackerman, Senators Ask Spy Chief: Are You Tracking Us Through Our 
iPhones?, WIRED (July 14, 2011, 9:26 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom 
/2011/07/senators-ask-spy-chief-are-you-tracking-us-through-our-iphones/.  
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See generally JEFFREY W. SEIFERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31798, DATA 
MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31798.pdf (discussing data mining as an 
important aspect of homeland security and its increasing prevalence in both the 
private and public sector). 
 17.  Bill Lochten, Improving Prediction, C4ISR JOURNAL, Nov./Dec. 2011, at 39. 
 18.  CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4169, NATIONAL SECURITY 
LETTERS: PROPOSALS IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 1 (2011), available at http://www.fas 
.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41619.pdf.  
 19.  National Security Letters, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 10, 2011), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security-technology-and-liberty/national-security-
letters. 
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abuses of [its] NSL power.”20 
Additionally, after 9/11 the vast technological capabilities of 
the Department of Defense’s National Security Agency (NSA)21 
were harnessed to address the threat of terrorism, both abroad and 
at home.  Regrettably, abuse occurred here as well.  Government 
lawyers believed that the president had the authority to authorize 
NSA to conduct a surveillance program without court approval.22  
However, a federal judge ruled in a lawsuit arising out of such 
activity “that [the NSA] illegally intercepted the electronic 
communications without warrants.” 23  Consequently, the court 
ordered the government to pay $2.5 million in attorney fees and 
damages.24 
Rather remarkably, Americans do not seem to be overly 
concerned about the cost in terms of civil liberty that post-9/11 
efforts to provide security have imposed.  A poll taken in August 
2011 found that 51% of Americans feel that “as a result of steps 
taken by the government to fight terrorism, they have lost some of 
their personal freedoms.”25  At the same time, however, the poll 
also showed that 60% of Americans believe that the “government is 
doing enough to protect rights and freedoms.”26  Law professor 
Jonathan Turley describes the seeming paradox: 
After 9/11, President George W. Bush greatly expanded 
the scope of warrantless surveillance, and President 
Obama has maintained and even increased those powers.  
Citizens have largely accepted the false premise that 
privacy is the enemy of security and have supported ever-
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Reportedly, the NSA “intercept[s] and store[s] 1.7 billion e-mails, phone 
calls and other types of communications” every day.  See Dana Priest & William M. 
Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. POST (July 19, 2010), 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-
growing-beyond-control/. 
 22.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NSA PROGRAM TO DETECT AND PREVENT 
TERRORIST ATTACKS: MYTH V. REALITY (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov 
/opa/documents/nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf. 
 23.  Paul Elias, Judge Orders Feds to Pay $2.5M in Wiretapping Case, WASH. TIMES 
(Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/22/judge-
orders-feds-pay-25m-wiretapping-case/. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  D. HIMBERGER ET AL., CIVIL LIBERTIES AND SECURITY: TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS-NORC CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH 4 (2011), available 
at http://www.apnorc.org/Common/pdfs/AP-NORC-Civil-Liberties-Security-9-11-
Report.pdf. 
 26.  Id. 
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widening surveillance powers.  The problem is that privacy 
remains an abstraction, while crime, or terrorism, is a 
concrete threat.27 
This does not mean that it is inevitable that the rise of 
advanced technologies will necessarily require excessive 
compromises of individual rights.  For example, with respect to 
cyber threats, Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the commander of U.S. 
Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency, 
believes that not only can the United States “come up with a 
defensive program that . . . can defend this country and our 
companies in cyberspace,” it can do so in a way that “can protect 
civil liberties and privacy.”28 
Of course, the concerns about civil liberties are not limited to 
technologies as more traditional police approaches can raise alarms 
as well.  Not long ago it was revealed that the New York Police 
Department was targeting the city’s Moroccan community in the 
name of fighting terrorism.  The Associated Press (AP) reported 
that: 
Undercover officers snapped photographs of restaurants 
frequented by Moroccans, including one that was noted 
for serving “religious Muslims.”  Police documented where 
Moroccans bought groceries, which hotels they visited and 
where they prayed.  While visiting an apartment used by 
new Moroccan immigrants, one officer noted in his 
reports that he saw two Qurans and a calendar from a 
nearby mosque.29 
The AP quoted an official as conceding that ‘“[a] lot of these 
locations were innocent’” and that they ‘“just happened to be in 
the community.’”  Yet no effort appears to be made to eliminate or 
narrow the program.30 
Ominously, the future will present even more new and 
complex challenges.  The Brookings Institution recently held a 
 
 27. Jonathan Turley, Supreme Court’s GPS Case Asks: How Much Privacy Do We 
Expect?, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions 
/supreme-courts-gps-case-asks-how-much-privacy-do-we-
expect/2011/11/10/gIQAN0RzCN_story_1.html. 
 28. Donna Miles, Cyber Defense Requires Teamwork, Agility, Alexander Says, U.S. 
DEP’T DEF. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id 
=65846. 
 29. Matt Apuzzo, AP Impact: NYPD Ethnic Tracking Included Citizens, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9860821. 
 30. Id. 
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forum, Constitution 3.0: Freedom, Technological Change and the Law,31 
which posed the technologically foreseeable scenario where the 
ever-increasing number of cameras surveilling public places as 
crime prevention and counterterrorism tools were fused in a way 
that permitted anyone with access to the Internet to track the 
movements of individuals. 
Other scenarios included hypotheticals involving the 
application of brain-scanning technology to otherwise silent 
terrorism suspects to glean information from them, raising the 
question whether it would violate “cognitive liberty” protected by 
the Fifth Amendment’s proscription against self-incrimination, or 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful search and 
seizure. 
Few fully satisfactory answers were produced at the forum, but 
the questions illustrate what may be the most lasting legacies of 
9/11, that is, the growing normalization of the application of 
advanced intelligence-gathering technologies into civilian settings, 
to include situations beyond counterterrorism, and the consequent 
loss of privacy, if not civil liberties.  It is not yet clear how these 
phenomena might change American life, but it appears rather 
certain that they will. 
Finally, we should not forget that respected experts still insist 
that “[i]f anything . . . the terrorist threat today is even greater and 
more multifaceted than ever.”32  One need not accept that dark 
premise to nevertheless agree it would be dangerous to become 
complacent.  Persistence, vigilance, and continual evaluation and 
re-evaluation of threats and our response to them are necessities of 
the twenty-first century life. 
2. WHAT IMPACT WILL THE “ARAB SPRING” HAVE ON AMERICAN 
NATIONAL SECURITY? 
The impact of the “Arab Spring” on American national 
security is, of course, still evolving.  One can be hopeful that it will 
produce if not liberal democracies in an American sense, at least 
governmental structures that are responsive to their peoples, have a 
sense of human dignity, and are supportive of an economic system 
 
 31. Constitution 3.0: Freedom, Technological Change and the Law, BROOKINGS INST. 
(Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events 
/2011/1213_constitution_technology/20111213_constitution_technology.pdf. 
 32. Clark Kent Ervin, Department of Insecurity, ASPEN IDEA, Winter 2011/2012, 
at 78. 
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capable of providing an acceptable standard of living to their 
constituents. 
According to the Middle East Institute, the “Arab Spring” will 
produce effects that may have mixed impacts on U.S. security 
interests.33  The Institute says, for example, that while the “Arab 
Spring” shows that the United States no longer has the “prestige 
and resources to dominate Middle East affairs,” the U.S. role in the 
Arabian Gulf particularly “remains paramount.”34  Importantly, the 
Institute also says that on “terrorism, the Arab Spring uprisings 
underscore the bankruptcy of Islamic extremist philosophy 
sanctioning violence as the only way to attain societal changes.”35 
Dr. W. Andrew Terrill of the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies 
Institute contends that “the spread of less corrupt and more 
democratic governments in the Middle East will be of tremendous 
benefit to the United States,” but warns that “it must be understood 
that democracy is not an inevitable outcome for any of the 
countries involved.”36  He says that thus far, “the role of the United 
States in this region has not emerged as a central or even important 
part of the disagreement between revolutionaries and members of 
the government.”37 
In any event, Dr. Terrill does not believe the new leaders will 
have “the political clout or repressive capability to demand more 
sacrifice from their populations in order to challenge the West.”38  
Still, Dr. Terrill counsels that “[w]hatever policies the United States 
adopts toward the Arab Spring countries some risk will have to be 
assumed because of their uncertain futures.”39 
This is good advice.  Americans would be wise to temper their 
expectations, and have an appreciation for the sheer difficulty of 
transforming societies imprinted with decades of authoritarian 
rule.  There is simply little in recent history to show that such states, 
particularly in the Middle East, can transform themselves without 
 
 33. Allen L. Keiswetter, The Arab Spring: Implications for U.S. Policy and Interests, 
MIDDLE EAST INST. (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.mei.edu/content/arab-spring-
implications-us-policy-and-interests. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and 
Cooperative Security in the Arab World, STRATEGIC STUD. INST.: U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. 
(Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles 
/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-of-US-Interests/2011/8/2#summary. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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considerable social angst, not to mention bloodshed.  There will 
likely be much of both in the years ahead. 
Furthermore, it may be that some of the newly formed 
governments may seize the opportunity to emphasize their 
independence from Western influences (and especially from that 
of the United States) as something of a totem of their liberation 
from decades of autocratic rule.  We may hear disturbing rhetoric 
emerge from the still-volatile region that might suggest a turning 
away from the United States, even in places such as Egypt where the 
United States has enjoyed cordial if not truly friendly relations. 
It would be prudent, perhaps, not to make too much of such 
almost inevitable pronouncements.  America’s importance—and 
value—will not likely be lost on whatever governments emerge.  As 
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed: 
The fact is, governments deal with the United States 
because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not 
because they trust us, and not because they believe we can 
keep secrets.  Many governments—some governments 
deal with us because they fear us, some because they 
respect us, most because they need us.  We are still 
essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable 
nation.40 
Given that it proved to be the centerpiece of the “Arab 
Spring,” the no-boots-on-the-ground military methodology America 
employed in NATO’s Libya operation is worth noting.  Why?  
Judging from polls, Americans are disillusioned with large 
“footprint” military operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan 
that proved so costly in terms of blood and treasure.41  After a 
decade of attempting to use masses of U.S. troops on the ground to 
accomplish political objectives, the fact that U.S. near-term goals in 
Libya were achieved by an air-only campaign at relatively little 
cost—and with the loss of no American lives—will certainly give 
 
 40. DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon, 
U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript 
.aspx?transcriptid=4728. 
 41. A November 2011 poll found that 63% of Americans oppose the United 
States war in Afghanistan.  See Afghanistan, POLLINGREPORT.COM, 
http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012) (citing a 
CNN/ORC Poll. Nov. 18–20, 2011).  Similarly, a November 2011 poll about Iraq 
found that 67% of Americans believed that the result of the war with Iraq was not 
worth the loss of American lives and other costs.  See Iraq, POLLINGREPORT.COM, 
http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm  (last visited Apr. 22, 2012) (citing a CBS 
News Poll. Nov. 6–10, 2011). 
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policymakers something to think about in terms of military options 
in future contingencies.42 
It also may shape U.S. defense resourcing as well.  The 
experience with Libya and, even more so, the much-discussed 
“pivot” towards Asia,43 could bring a greater prominence to air and 
naval modernization, and a de-emphasis on land force spending 
that has dominated the last decade.44  Time Magazine contributor 
Mark Thompson wrote that the Libya operation, along with 
reflection on the conduct of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, may 
inspire a realization of the limitations of military force.45  “It’s 
good” he says, “for whacking someone—punishment, vengeance—
but far less helpful when it comes to remaking a foreign land.”46  As 
to what this will mean for the future, Thompson says: 
[H]istory offers important clues here: the last land war we 
cleanly won was the European theater in World War II—
nearly 70 years ago.  Since then, U.S. victories in land 
wars—Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan—have been 
elusive (the first Gulf War lasted less than 100 hours on 
the ground; air power did all the heavy lifting).  So after 
the exclamation point generated by Gaddafi’s death, the 
nation is left with a question mark: why keep a big and 
costly land army hanging around if all it does is encourage 
the nation to engage in wars it has little chance of 
winning?47 
Answering that complicated question may be an unexpected but 
important impact of the “Arab Spring” on American national 
security. 
 
 42. John A. Tirpak, Lessons from Libya, AIR FORCE MAG., Dec. 2011, at 34, 
available at http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents 
/2011/December%202011/1211libya.pdf. 
 43. Elisabeth H. Bumiller, U.S. Pivots Eastward to Address Uneasy Allies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25 
/world/asia/united-states-pivots-eastward-to-reassure-allies-on-china.html. 
 44. This appears to be the case as reflected in the U.S. Department of 
Defense guidance issued in January 2012.  See generally U.S. DEP’T DEF., SUSTAINING 
U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE (Jan. 2012), available 
at http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 
 45. Mark Thompson, Libya’s Lessons, TIME BATTLELAND BLOG (Oct. 20, 2011), 
http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/10/20/libyas-lessons/#ixzz1gzthZwNr. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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3. WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION’S HANDLING OF THE AHMED WARSAME CASE? 
The Ahmed Warsame case represents one of the central 
questions for counterterrorism policymakers, that is, what to do 
with terrorists who are picked up by U.S. forces somewhere in the 
world?  The problem is particularly exacerbated given America’s 
exit from Iraq, and Afghanistan’s understandable reluctance to 
incarcerate foreigners not apprehended in their country. 
According to the Justice Department, Warsame “was captured 
in the Gulf region by the U.S. military on April 19, 2011, and was 
questioned for intelligence purposes for more than two months.”48  
He was then transported to the jurisdiction of the Southern District 
of New York where he was “indicted on charges of providing 
material support to al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) . . . as well as conspiring to teach and 
demonstrate the making of explosives, possessing firearms and 
explosives in furtherance of crimes of violence, and other 
violations.”49 
In deciding to resolve the case in civilian courts, John 
Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, revealed that: 
[T]he President’s national security team unanimously 
agreed that the best option for prosecuting him was our 
federal courts, where, among other advantages, we could 
avoid significant risks associated with, and pursue 
additional charges not available in, a military 
commission.  And, if convicted of certain charges, he faces 
a mandatory life sentence.50 
Writing in the New York Times, journalist Charlie Savage reports 
the administration “settled on the civilian trial option because 
officials did not want to add a new inmate to the Guantánamo 
prison.” 51  In addition, he says that some considered a military trial 
 
 48. Accused Al Shabaab Leader Charged with Providing Material Support to Al 
Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/cjs/docs/news-07052011.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 49. Id. 
 50. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & 
Counterterrorism, Address Before Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law 
School: Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws, (Sept. 16, 
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16 
/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an. 
 51. Charlie Savage, U.S. Tests New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect, 
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to be “problematic” because of the uncertain status of “material 
support” as a war crime, a necessary showing for military 
commission jurisdiction.52  Still, the decision to forgo military 
commissions was subject to criticism.  Senator Mitch McConnell 
argued that the “administration’s actions are inexplicable, create 
unnecessary risks here at home, and do nothing to increase the 
security of the United States.”53 
Another feature of the Warsame case was the determination to 
create two different interrogation statuses.  The first was the 
interrogation by intelligence officers prior to his entry into the 
civilian judicial system.  During this period he was not advised of his 
Miranda rights.54  After his delivery to civilian authorities and prior 
to his interrogation by law enforcement personnel, the Justice 
Department says he “was read his Miranda rights, and after waiving 
those rights, he spoke to law enforcement agents for several days.”55 
These differing interrogation statuses can create further 
complications because the first, unwarned interrogation might 
raise questions about the voluntariness of the subsequent waiver of 
rights.  Moreover, even if the second interrogation otherwise 
conforms to constitutional standards, the prosecution must ensure 
that no information from the earlier, unwarned but custodial 
interrogations is allowed to bleed into the criminal case in a way 
that taints the proceedings. 
Importantly, Savage also reports that Senator Lindsey Graham, 
while having no particular objection to a civilian trial, nevertheless 
“contended that the administration had rushed the man’s initial 
interrogation because it had no good place to detain him for a 
longer period, showing the need for a prison like Guantánamo for 
other current and future detainees.”56  This set the stage for a clash 
with the administration over detainee policy that very nearly caused 
the President to veto the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA).57 
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In its Statement of Administration Policy, the administration 
formally argued that provisions in drafts of the NDAA would 
“disrupt the Executive branch’s ability to enforce the law and 
impose unwise and unwarranted restrictions on the U.S. 
Government’s ability to aggressively combat international 
terrorism . . . [and] inject legal uncertainty and ambiguity that may 
only complicate the military’s operations and detention 
practices.”58  To avoid a possible veto, last-minute revisions 
produced a bill that, according to the White House, does not 
“challenge or constrain the President’s [ability] to collect 
intelligence, incapacitate dangerous terrorists, and protect the 
Nation.”59 
The revisions, however, did not silence critics.  Professor David 
Cole criticizes the compromise for creating “a presumption in favor 
of indefinite military detention” for foreign terrorism suspects.60  
“Equally problematic,” in his view, is that the law provides for 
indefinite detention of “anyone who has provided ‘substantial 
support’ to groups that are ‘associated forces’ of al Qaeda.”61  
Moreover, he objects to various provisions and requirements that 
“effectively prevent President Obama from closing Guantanamo.” 62 
Ironically, shortly after this agreement was reached, came the 
news that a terrorist accused of the killings of American soldiers 
was released to Iraqi authorities as U.S. troops departed the 
country.63  Subject to sharp criticism, one reason alleged for the 
release was that “Obama had not allowed new detainees to be sent 
to the Guantánamo prison in Cuba.”64  Senator Kelly Ayotte said 
that “Daqduq [the detainee released] could have been detained at 
Guantánamo, and this decision by the administration is yet more 
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evidence of the need for a coherent detention policy for 
terrorists.”65 
Actually, any release to U.S. authorities would have required 
the cooperation of the Iraqi government, which evidently chose to 
deal with Daqduq through their own legal processes.66  Regardless, 
the Warsame case and now the Daqduq matter illustrate that the 
United States still has not achieved political consensus for an 
overall plan to deal with terrorism suspects.  As concerning as this 
is, in the near term it may well be that the best—and most 
realistically viable—solution is an ad hoc, case-by-case one, with 
decisions guided by the specific facts of each situation. 
4. OF ALL THE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY, WHICH TYPE IS THE 
U.S. LEAST PREPARED TO HANDLE?  WHERE IS THE U.S. MOST 
VULNERABLE TO ATTACK? 
It is important to note that even among government officials 
there is no consensus as to what exactly menaces the nation most.  
In November 2011, Foreign Policy blogger Joshua Keating plaintively 
asked “[c]an anyone agree on what America’s ‘greatest threat’ is?” 
and recorded the wide divergence of views by various opinion-
makers.67  The assessments ranged from the Chinese nuclear 
arsenal, to cyber attacks, to Iran.68 
Some experts think of threats in strategic, albeit indirect, 
terms.  Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 
Michael Mullen, for example, said in 2010 that the “single biggest 
threat to national security is the national debt.”69  His erstwhile 
boss, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, surprised many observers 
when he told workers at a submarine plant in November 2011 that 
“[w]e face the threats from rising powers, China, India, others that 
we have to always be aware of”—comments his aides immediately 
 
 65.  Charlie Savage, U.S. Transfers Its Last Prisoner in Iraq to Iraqi Custody, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17 
/world/middleeast/us-transfers-last-prisoner-to-iraqi-government.html. 
 66.  Id. 
 67. Joshua Keating, Can Anyone Agree on What America’s ‘Greatest Threat’ Is?, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 3, 2011, 11:37 AM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts 
/2011/11/03/can_anyone_agree_on_what_americas_greatest_threat_is.  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Michael J. Carden, National Debt Poses Security Threat, Mullen Says, 
AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/news 
/newsarticle.aspx?id=60621. 
  
1578 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:5 
disavowed.70 
More formally, Mr. James Clapper, the Director of National 
Intelligence, enumerated a number of threats around the globe in 
his February 2011 Statement for the Record in connection with his 
testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence.71  Clapper insisted, however, that “[t]errorism will 
remain at the forefront of our national security threats over the 
coming year.”72 
How serious is the threat of terrorism, qua terrorism?  In 2010, 
analysts writing in Foreign Affairs asserted that the terrorism peril is 
“hardly existential” and the risk of it is “so low that spending to 
further reduce its likelihood or consequences is scarcely justified.”73  
Regarding nuclear terrorism, experts agree that it “is commonly 
held to be the single most serious threat to the national security of 
the United States,” but some also insist that “the likelihood that a 
terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be 
vanishingly small.”74 
Cyber attacks are also often cited as the kind of threat for 
which the United States is unprepared.  Certainly, cyber security 
can be improved, especially defenses against cyber theft and cyber 
espionage.  Congress is rightly considering a number of proposals.75  
However, it is also becoming increasingly clear that the threat of 
actual cyberwar may well be over-hyped.  For example, while cyber 
authority Jerry Brito concedes that “there is the possibility of a 
cyber attack so severe that it could result in casualties, thus 
qualifying as an act of war,” he further adds the caution that “it is 
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extremely rare and unlikely.”76  Similarly, a report by British experts 
in January of 2011 concluded that “[i]t is unlikely that there will 
ever be a true cyberwar.”77 
It is not hard to see why.  Contrary to popular belief, cyber 
operations that are militarily significant are difficult to conduct, 
even on the tactical level.  In its report about the rejection of cyber 
methodologies for the operations against Muammar Gaddafi’s air 
defense forces in Libya, the New York Times observed that: 
While popular fiction and films depict cyberattacks as easy 
to mount—only a few computer keystrokes needed—in 
reality it takes significant digital snooping to identify 
potential entry points and susceptible nodes in a linked 
network of communications systems, radars and missiles 
like that operated by the Libyan government, and then to 
write and insert the proper poisonous codes.78 
Thus, while cyberwar remains a genuine concern, the 
vulnerabilities of the United States may be overstated by some.  
Indeed, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) declared in 
November  2011 that it could defend the United States, including 
the use of offensive operations if necessary.  Specifically, DoD 
asserted that it “has the capability to conduct offensive operations 
in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests.”79  The 
report also makes it clear that the United States would not 
necessarily limit its defensive response to cyber attacks to responses 
in kind; kinetic counters would also be considered.80 
This is significant.  To the extent that cyber war is an authentic 
threat, the kind of attacks that could cripple the entire nation 
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could be mounted, if at all, only by nation-states.  In doing so, such 
nation-states must calculate the U.S. response, not just in cyber 
terms, but also with respect to the enormous kinetic capabilities of 
the U.S. armed forces.  There is no reason to think that nation-
states currently deterred by America’s military might would assume 
that a cyber attack would not generate a debilitating response, 
either by a counter-cyber assault or by a more traditional strike 
from the world’s foremost military power. 
Much the same can be said about the threat of bioterrorism.  
Somewhat surprisingly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently 
insisted that a “crude but effective terrorist weapon can be made 
by using a small sample of any number of widely available 
pathogens, inexpensive equipment and college-level chemistry 
and biology.”81  She further contends that “less than a year ago, al-
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for, and I 
quote, ‘brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to 
develop a weapon of mass destruction.’”82 
Actually, however, Clinton’s recitation of al Qaeda’s call to 
arms indicates that they were seeking expertise, not that they 
already had it.  This is the same reason some experts insist that 
the threat of bioterrorism has been over-hyped.83  If as Secretary 
Clinton says, the pathogens were really “widely available” and 
their manufacture only required “inexpensive equipment” and 
“college-level” training, why have we not seen attacks from 
extremists bent on harming Americans in any way they can?  The 
reason may well be that, like cyber attacks, it is harder to do than 
popular perceptions would have one believe. 
None of this is to suggest that cyber attacks or bioterrorism are 
threats to be ignored; rather, it is merely to say that reasoned 
decisions must be made in an era of austere security resources.  In 
the case of bioterrorism, for example, the United States has spent 
“at least $33 billion since 2002 to combat the threat of biological 
terrorism.”84  The question is the degree to which further 
expenditures are warranted. 
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What then about the threat posed by nation-states?  Mr. 
Clapper, in testimony before the Senate, reiterated his claim that 
terrorism was his “first and foremost” concern, but nevertheless 
admitted that Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals represented a 
“mortal” threat to the United States.85  Again, this is the critical non-
existential versus existential distinction in threat analysis.  This is 
the difference between arguably more likely—albeit less 
dangerous—events such as an act of terrorism, and the remote but 
vastly more “mortal” threats posed by nation-states armed with 
nuclear weaponry. 
Iran is the potential nuclear power currently causing the 
international community the most anxiety.  The United States 
identifies Iran and its nuclear ambitions as “a major threat to U.S. 
national security interests,”86 yet seems to have enjoyed only limited 
success in addressing it.  Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense Panetta 
recently insisted that the “the combination of economic and 
diplomatic sanctions that have been placed on Iran have had a 
serious impact,” and represents it is the “best way” to “ultimately 
weaken this nation, so that ultimately they have to make a decision 
about whether they continue to be a pariah or whether they decide 
to join the international community.”87 
Panetta admitted that force was a “last resort.”88  If it would 
come to that, it can be said that the United States is as “prepared to 
handle” it as any nation on earth.  Moreover, as terrible as a 
nuclear-armed Iran might be to U.S. interests, the threat, per se, 
does not represent a direct “vulnerability” to the United States as 
possession of the weapon is only one element; an effective delivery 
system is also needed.  Much the same can be said about North 
Korea, even as its future becomes even more uncertain with the 
death of Kim Jong Il. 
That cannot, however, be said about Russia or China.  China 
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seems to present something of a conundrum for American security 
officials.  On the one hand, they seem to want to down play its 
military potential, apparently in the hopes of not appearing 
provocative, yet on the other, they are forced to recognize China’s 
increasingly ominous potential.  Thus, although Michèle Flournoy, 
Undersecretary of Defense for policy, declared that as a matter of 
official policy, the United States does “‘not view China as an 
adversary;’”89 there is no question that China’s military strength 
continues to grow and the Pentagon knows it. 
In its 2011 report to Congress about China, for example, the 
Pentagon was obliged to concede that: 
Since the early 1990s PRC [People’s Republic of China] 
leaders have sustained an ambitious and broad-based 
military modernization program intended to transform 
the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] into a modern force.  
Although the PLA currently retains a large number of 
legacy platforms and weapons, the percentage of modern 
equipment in the force is growing rapidly.  China has 
closed important technological gaps and achieved some 
capabilities that are on par with or exceed global 
standards.90 
This, perhaps, suggests a peril for which the United States has 
a real vulnerability, that is, whether or not America can continue to 
maintain technologically superior arms.  Barry Watts, a Senior 
Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, told 
Congress last October that the “prospects for the continued success 
of for-profit defense firms in providing the U.S. armed forces with 
superior weaponry and equipment—especially at affordable costs—
may be at risk unless both the defense industrial base itself and the 
business practices of the U.S. government undergo fundamental 
restructuring.”91 
According to Watts, the Department of Defense’s approach of 
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relying on market forces to maintain an adequate industrial 
capability misperceives how the U.S. defense industry functions.  In 
reality, he says, “the defense industrial base is highly regulated by 
both DoD and Congress” and is structurally “unique in having a 
monopsony buyer—the U.S. government (which is also the 
regulator)—and a few oligopoly suppliers in each sector due to the 
consolidations of the 1990s.”92 
Watt’s comments are just the latest in a growing cacophony of 
warnings heard from a number of experts.  For example, IIan 
Berman of the American Foreign Policy Council cautioned that 
unlike “practically every declared nuclear weapon state,” the 
United States “has allowed its strategic infrastructure to atrophy 
since the end of the Cold War.93  Moreover, retired Air Force Lt. 
Gen. David Deptula declared in 2010 that “we have a geriatric 
bomber force, [and] a geriatric fighter force.  We have a geriatric 
Air Force, quite frankly.”94  All of this may indicate a declining 
defense industrial base, which, actually, constitutes the “threat” that 
the Unites States is “least prepared to handle”. 
Looking ahead, U.S. defense strategists also need to concern 
themselves with the rise of a new kind of peril; one that is 
occasioned by the rise of violent entities that some call “criminal 
insurgencies.”  The accuracy of the appellation is subject to 
debate,95 but what is not debated is the level of violence these 
entities are causing, especially for America’s southern neighbor, 
Mexico.  A 2011 RAND report points out that there were more 
than 30,000 drug-related deaths in Mexico between December 
2006 and December 2010.96  In addition, the violence has extended 
beyond the killings of rival gang members and innocent bystanders, 
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to representatives of the state, including assassinations of politicians 
and judges, and attacks on police and other security forces, as well 
as their families.97   
As described by RAND, the situation in Mexico has acquired 
characteristics of an insurgency, with the likelihood of continued 
high-levels of violence.  Rep. Connie Mack declared the situation 
along the U.S. border a “threat to national security” and proposed 
legislation that “would treat Mexican drug cartels like terrorists and 
apply a counterinsurgency strategy to the growing violence along 
the Southern border.”98  A study by the Center for a New American 
Security (CNAS) came to a similar conclusion, and plainly 
identified the national security implications:  
Criminal networks linking cartels and gangs are no longer 
simply a crime problem, but a threat that is metastasizing 
into a new form of widespread, networked criminal 
insurgency.  The scale and violence of these networks 
threaten civil governments and civil societies in the 
Western Hemisphere and, increasingly, the United States 
as well.99  
The threat of these criminal insurgencies destabilizing Mexico 
is troubling enough, but the evidence that Guatemala and perhaps 
the rest of Central America is at risk is—or should be—a matter of 
grave concern.100  That realization however, may not have 
infiltrated the thinking of the defense bureaucracy as far as it needs 
to penetrate.  Specifically, the CNAS report says that “American 
policymakers have been slow to recognize the evolution of the drug 
cartels and gangs from purely law enforcement problems to the 
strategic threat they now pose.”101 
This may be another key threat for which the United States is 
not as prepared as it should be, even though the vulnerabilities to 
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“spill over” to the domestic environment are readily apparent.  
Indeed, the U.S. Justice Department’s National Drug Threat 
Assessment for 2011 says that what it calls “transnational criminal 
organizations” were operating “in more than a thousand U.S. cities 
during 2009 and 2010.”102  Addressing this dangerous situation 
needs to be a top priority of America’s security establishment. 
5. WHAT FACTORS WILL HELP DETERMINE WHETHER AL QAEDA HAS 
BEEN DEFEATED? 
An obvious factor in determining the viability of al Qaeda will 
be the public statements of U.S. officials with access to America’s 
immense intelligence apparatus.  In that regard, Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta famously (infamously?) announced in July  
2011 that he is convinced that “‘we’re within reach of strategically 
defeating al Qaeda.’”103  One presumes, therefore, that at some 
point in the not-too-distant future America will be told that al 
Qaeda’s “strategic defeat” has been achieved. 
Even those without access to intelligence information will have 
some objective data to measure al Qaeda’s current capability.  
Given that al Qaeda is ideologically committed to attacking the 
United States, the most convincing factor indicating its downfall 
will be the absence of an attack on the U.S. homeland connected 
with al Qaeda.  It really is that simple. 
Although a few attacks have been attempted, the fact that 
there have not been more of them cannot be attributed to some 
sudden change of disposition on the terrorists’ part, but rather a 
combination of better security at home, and direct strikes against al 
Qaeda lairs in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and 
elsewhere.  In addition, the security forces of many nations have 
hunted al Qaeda operatives with some real success. 
In any event, the death of Osama bin Laden seems to have 
been near-catastrophic for the organization.  Indeed, his demise, 
along with the killing of many of his lieutenants as a result of the 
U.S. drone campaign, has led many experts to believe the group is 
on the verge of defeat.  The Washington Post reported in November 
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2011 that counterterrorism officials said that al Qaeda’s leadership 
cadre was “reduced to just two figures whose demise would mean 
the group’s defeat.”104 
Still, even if “al Qaeda,” qua al Qaeda, is “defeated,” that does 
not mean that similar threats will likewise cease to exist.  It seems 
clear that other groups around the globe will continue to emerge, 
and they will no doubt try to employ the al Qaeda terror strategy as 
a template even if they are actually wholly distinct entities pursuing 
a different agenda.  We must accept that, from time to time, they 
probably will achieve some measure of success. 
In short, terrorism—at least at some level—is here to stay.  As 
the Supreme Court said in Boumediene v. Bush, the “real risks, the 
real threats, of terrorist attacks are constant and not likely soon to 
abate.”105  In dealing with this harsh reality, Americans may well 
want to carefully contemplate Benjamin Franklin’s famous dictum 
that “[a]nyone who trades liberty for security deserves neither 
liberty nor security” in working towards achieving the right balance 
of those two most precious ends.106 
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